In class action litigation involving the antitrust laws, it is often impossible or impracticable to compensate all victims. In such cases courts sometimes employ the doctrine of "cy pres" to put the unclaimed damage funds to "the next best use," which may include awarding funds to public interest organizations for purposes related in some way to the case. It is increasingly, and appropriately, being recognized that the cy pres doctrine can be utilized as part of a remedy for the purpose of carrying out the objectives of the antitrust laws by enhancing competition. At the same time, cy pres opens up possibilities of corruption, waste, and/or public criticism. This paper provides background on class action settlements and the law of cy pres, then offers a "best
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In reverter fund settlements, 5 the defendant contributes cash to an escrow account to be paid out to class members who apply for funds pursuant to a pre-set claims process, with any unclaimed funds reverting to the defendant at the end of the set period. This type of remedy is most likely to be applied where the amount of damages that will be claimed is reasonably predictable, as in many product liability class actions, where damages can be computed or future damages can be estimated, based on actual harm. In antitrust class actions, actual damages are often more speculative and consequently reverter funds historically have not played a significant role in the antitrust context, although starting in 2003, Microsoft Corporation began settling a series of consumer class action antitrust cases on terms that sometimes included reverter provisions. It has been reported that "so far, nearly 44% of the money in 16 of these settlements--$376 million--has gone back to Microsoft because nobody tried to claim it."
6 Coupon settlements are settlements in which class members do not receive an immediate cash payment, but rather the right "to obtain a discount on future purchases of the defendant's or possibly someone else's products or services." 7 The coupon settlement 5 Courts and commentators have used a variety of labels to describe this sort of fund, e.g., a "latent claim against unclaimed money in the judgment fund," Boeing v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 482, 100 S. Ct. 745 (1980) ; "remittitur" to defendant, In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1407, 1412 (D. Wyo. 1998); a "claims-made distribution," See Deborah R. Hensler et al., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 199 (2000) ; National Association of Consumer Advocates, Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Consumer Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 375, 398 (1997) . See also Robert P. Sugarman, Settlement Terms, Approval and Enforcement, 583 PLI/Lit 519 (April, 1998) . It must be noted, however, that some class action settlements are described as "claimsmade", without any reversion of funds to defendants. For example settlement funds that are not claimed might be redistributed among the claimants who do submit claims or might be allocated to the next best use that would provide indirect benefit to the class ("cy pres" distribution). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor called the reverter kind of settlement a "reversionary fund." See Int'l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223 , 1223 (2000 . Herbert Newberg describes such settlements as containing a "recapture clause" allowing the defendant to recapture the unclaimed portion of the fund. See Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 12.11, at 12-31 (3d ed. 1992) . 6 Steve Alexander, Most Microsoft Settlement Money Unclaimed, StarTribune.com, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, February 10, 2008 . Alexander says that if the current claims rate continues in four other states where claims are in progress (Iowa, Wisconsin, New York, and California), Microsoft will save itself more than $1 billion of the $2.6 billion allocated for the settlements. In Massachusetts, consumers and businesses claimed only 1% of the settlement. This strikes the author as strong evidence of the injustice inherent in the use of reverter in antitrust settlements.
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has several benefits for a defendant: (a) release from legal claims; (b) consumers have an increased incentive to continue a business relationship that may have been impaired by the underlying cause of the litigation or the litigation itself; and (c) economic advantages in the difference between compensating at the firm's cost rather than at retail, as well as the likelihood that fewer consumers will utilize the coupons than would have claimed cash.
Because of the advantages for the defendant, some courts 8 and commentators 9 (not to mention plaintiffs) have rejected the coupon approach as an antitrust remedy. On the one hand, the defendant (like Briar Rabbit begging not to be thrown into the briar patch) may gain a competitive benefit by using the discount to take sales away from innocent competitors; and, on the other, the injured class members, in order to recover damages, are required to make further purchases of the litigated product. 10 Particularly in antitrust cases, the economic ramifications and the effect on competition of coupon distribution and price reduction in the relevant markets should carefully be examined. In some circumstances, as in the California Microsoft settlement, 11 it will be preferable to require the defendant to honor coupons for purchases made from its competitors. 12 It seems elementary that the court should not approve a coupon remedy that will affect the marketplace in a way that may provide a competitive advantage to a firm that was charged with anticompetitive conduct.
II. THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN ANTITRUST CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
With reverter settlements not being used with frequency in antitrust class action settlements because of the difficulty in estimating damages and coupon remedies frequently having serious drawbacks for competition and for consumers, the cy pres remedy has evolved into a workable device that often fits well into an antitrust class action settlement. The cy pres doctrine 13 originated as a rule in the law of trusts and estates, allowing the Court to provide for the next-best use of gifts or fair disposition of charitable trusts or wills that would otherwise fail. 14 By analogy, courts now apply the cy 11 See Settlement Agreement, In re Microsoft Cases, J.C.C.P No.. 4106 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2003) , available at http:// www.microsoftcalsettlement.com/PDF/SettlementAgreement.pdf The settlement provides up to $1.1 billion of vouchers that people and businesses can use toward the purchase of desktop, laptop or tablet computers, printers, scanners, monitors, keyboards and generally available software made by any manufacturer. The settlement applies to consumers and businesses that acquired Microsoft Windows, MS-DOS, Office, Word, Excel, Works Suite or Home Essentials between February 18, 1995 and December 15, 2001 for use in California.
Another, very particular form of coupon distribution was used in In Re Starlink Corn Products Liability Litigation, No. 03 C 4385 (N.D. Ill.) . There, a $100mm settlement was reached in which class settlement funds were distributed not by cash or check but as stored funds on prepaid debit cards. Class members in the case were corn farmers, allegedly damaged by improper distribution of genetically engineered corn seed. The settlement gave the class members three options: they could (1) get 10% discount off the total purchase prices of Tractor Supply Company; (2) use the card as an ordinary debit card anywhere in the world Visa-branded cards are accepted; or (3) get cash back from US post offices. See www.nonstarlinkfarmerssettlement.com.
12 An additional disadvantage of discount remedies is that "because future price reduction is basically a method for compensating class members, its value is lessened when consumers are not likely to make repeat purchases" whether from the defendant or from other sellers. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 5 . 13 The cy pres doctrine is sometimes known as the fluid recovery rule.
14 When literal construction of the original purpose of the trust or bequest is impracticable or illegal, courts apply the cy pres rule of construction to determine the interpretation of instruments as nearly as possible in conformity with the original intention of the testator. See B.A. Vauter, The Next Best Thing, settlements 7 pres doctrine in class actions, including antitrust class actions, where direct distribution of the damages awarded to all the class members is not feasible, permitting funds to be distributed "in the next best fashion in order to benefit the intended class as closely as possible and to avoid retention of ill-gotten gains by defendants."
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In other words, the cy pres doctrine-which is nothing new--permits unclaimed or residual class action funds to be put to their next best use for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of class members, a process known as aggregate cy pres distribution.
In such an event, one or more third parties or agencies are placed in charge of administering the funds and ensuring that they are used for designated purposes.
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Cy pres remedies fall into two general categories: "earmarked escheat" and consumer trust funds. Earmarked escheat involves a governmental plaintiff. In governmental escheat the residue is directly deposited into a government agency's general fund, again "for use on projects that benefit non-collecting class members and promote the purposes of the underlying cause of action". 17 The consumer trust fund approach aims at financing A fundamental question that has arisen in a few cy pres distributions is whether it is, in the first place, proper to dole out damage funds to anyone other than a member of the plaintiff class who has filed a qualified claim. This question should be answered in the affirmative, under the right conditions. In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, the court discussed the legal status of a reserved fund. 20 The court first ruled that the defendants had relinquished any claim to any portion of the settlement fund because they had irrevocably transferred the fund, and therefore denied the defendants' request that distribution of the reserve fund be to them. The court also determined that the claiming plaintiffs, former class members whose claims against the fund had been fully satisfied through receipt of more than their anticipated share of the fund, had no legal right against the remainder of the fund. However the court did allow non-claiming former class members, who had failed to timely file claims against the fund, to file equitable claims against the reserve fund. 21 It is true that a fluid recovery fund only exists while some money must be paid into the general fund of the state. Minnesota statute 16A.151, Proceeds of Litigation or Settlement. Of all the fluid recovery devices, general escheat provides the least focused compensation to the class. The benefits of the recovery are spread among all taxpayers, and there is no attempt to ensure that the spillover is used to effectuate the purposes of the substantive law. [...] The only advantage of general escheat is ease of administration. Hence, it is usually regarded as a last resort for use where a more precise remedy cannot be found […]" 715 P.2d 564, 572 (Cal. 1986 (1994)). Some states have statutes or rules that directly address the cy pres question. In Washington, 25% of residual funds must be distributed to the "Legal Foundation of Washington to support activities and programs that promote access to the civil justice system for low income residents of Washington State." Washington State Court Rules, Rule 23, Part IV, (f), accessible at http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.rulesPDF&groupName=sup&setName=CR. In Illinois, up to 50% of the residual funds in a settlement "may be distributed to one or more other [i.e., not the class] organizations that serve the public good if the court finds there is good cause to approve such a distribution as pat of a settlement." Illinois State, The Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2-807, available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=09500SB0486&GA=95&SessionId=51&DocTypeI d=SB&LegID=&DocNum=0486&GAID=9&Session=. In California, Section 384 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies that unpaid class funds shall be subject to cy pres distribution. The section was amended in 2001 to enhance the ability of the court to distribute the money to a variety of groups. Brad Seligman and Jocelyn Larkin, FLUID RECOVERY AND CY PRES: A FUNDING SOURCE FOR LEGAL SERVICES (The Impact Fund, 2005) , on file with the author, at http://www.impacthund.org/CyPres2000FED.html. 33 Substantive antitrust principles were not altered by the allowance of parens patriae actions. Before the Hart-Scott-Rodino amendments, in actions based on the federal antitrust laws, the states could only seek to obtain injunctive relief or to recover for actual injury to the businesses or property of their state's naturalperson citizens. Following the HSR amendments, states have the authority to directly pursue antitrust damages for consumers. See id. H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, at 9 (1976) 34 See generally Farmer, supra note 24.
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damaged by an action that has also brought direct harm to specific businesses or consumers.
While the discretion of a court in shaping or approving a cy pres remedy is great, there are nevertheless certain constraints, to which we turn in the next section.
III. NEXUS: THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT
The purpose of a remedy in an antitrust case is three-fold: to protect or restore competition in the market, to deter anticompetitive behavior, and to compensate victims of illegal conduct. All of these goals are applicable in the remedy phase of a class action adjudication or settlement. When an aggregate amount of damages is established, the primary objective is to distribute the damages to those who were directly damaged, i.e. the members of the class who come forward with bona fide claims. Sometimes there is money left over in the form of unclaimed funds. Occasionally, there may be administrative reasons that outweigh making payments to individual plaintiffs, e.g., in the case of an extremely large class where the fund is not large enough to justify the transaction costs of distribution. In either event, allowing courts to formulate broad cy pres distribution of damages has several significant benefits. First, deterrence is served because the unclaimed funds do not return to the defendant. Second, the defendant is not unjustly enriched if all potential plaintiffs do not assert a claim. Third, because the funds will be used to help promote competition or dissuade the kinds of actions that constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, or will benefit the society in general, the plaintiffs who did not assert a claim are indirectly benefited, along with the marketplace in general. 35 The essence of the cy pres doctrine, however, is that distributions should be made in a manner "as near as possible" to an immediate direct distribution. 36 In the case law, it 35 See K.M Forde, supra note 9. 36 In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002) June 26, 1985) (ordering the entire $6.1 million settlement in an alleged price fixing scheme among milk wholesalers, serving an eleven county market, be distributed among schools in the same eleven-county area to fund nutrition-related purposes or programs); Market Street Railway Company v. Railroad Commission, 171 P.2d 875, 881 (Cal. 1946 ) (court ordering the streetcar company to use unclaimed funds to improve transportation facilities that injured consumers used).
Although involving employment discrimination rather than antitrust, Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation 119 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 1997) is another interesting case. A class of African-American workers alleged the Georgia-Pacific Corporation had violated their rights. After the class members were compensated, nearly $ 1 million in settlement funds remained. Rather than distribute the remaining funds to class members, the district court ordered the parties to design a scholarship program to be administered by the Georgia-Pacific Foundation. Under the program, scholarships were to be awarded over ten years to 112 African-American high school students in the three counties in Arkansas and three parishes in Louisiana where most of the class members lived, with the remaining proceeds going to the United Negro College Fund. Not only did the scholarship program carry out the plaintiffs' desire to have scholarships benefit their younger relatives, it addressed the subject matter of the lawsuit --the employment opportunities available to AfricanAmericans living near Georgia-Pacific's facilities in Crossett, Arkansas.
In Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Housing Authority 802 F.2d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1986 ), which involved utility allowances, the court approved use of unclaimed funds to improve the energy efficiency of the apartment units, where members of the injured class lived.
See generally Draba, supra note 38.
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A direct nexus between the injured consumers and the cy pres recipients is neither always feasible nor required. As the trial court observed in Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., [I]n recent years, the [cy pres] doctrine appears to have become more flexible.
Funds remaining in antitrust cases have been awarded to law schools to support programs having little or no relationship to antitrust law, competition or the operation of our economy. […] [W]hile use of funds for purposes closely related to their origin is still the best cy pres application, the doctrine of cy pres and courts' broad equitable powers now permit use of funds for other public interest purposes by educational, charitable, and other public service organizations, both for current programs or, where appropriate, to constitute an endowment and source of future income for long-range programs to be used in conjunction with other funds raised contemporaneously.
41
When courts distribute funds that are to support various public interest programs (e.g. public health programs), the nexus between those directly harmed and the distribution of damages sometimes seems rather remote, although perhaps not altogether absent. For example, in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Company, the court ordered that a portion of the $37 million in damages from an antibiotic-related antitrust class action settlement be used to create public health programs not necessarily related to antibiotics. 42 These public health programs provided both damaged and undamaged consumers some benefit related to the antitrust injuries only in the general sense that both the injury and the cy pres distribution involved health care. To provide a more direct nexus to the case at hand, the court could have ordered that the public health programs be related to the particular type of health problems for which the antibiotics in the case were typically used. by an international cartel) and would benefit members of the injured class because the new Center would focus on problems of globalization and private antitrust enforcement.
Moreover, the Court was convinced by the Plaintiff's detailed and concrete plans that the Center had been carefully thought through and had a good chance for succeeding. Even the fact that some of the Center's work would involve foreign jurisdictions was found to support the proposal, because the Center could deter foreign cartels from actions that would harm U.S. consumers. The nexus to the underlying law suit was satisfied because the law suit involved an international cartel to fix prices. It was not necessary that the funds be used with respect to the chemical industry. antitrust that merit further study.
47
The nexus in Diamond Chemical was the relationship between the law violationan international price-fixing cartel-and the expenditure of cy pres funds, i.e., an educational and advocacy center that would focus at least to some extent on international antitrust enforcement. A relevant consideration was whether such an expenditure was necessary. The message to a public interest organization like the American Antitrust Institute seems to be that a class action cy pres settlement may be approved, even over the defendants' objection, in an antitrust case where the proposed expenditure, backed up Pa. 2005) , in which the court rejected a cy pres distribution to a legal clinic at the University of Pennsylvania Law School because it was not necessary to promote the cause of U.S. antitrust enforcement. Judge Kollar-Kotelly distinguished this because the current proposal did not involve funding a typical law school clinic that engages in the representation of clients.
47 Diamond Chemical at page 9 of slip opinion.
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in some detail, is to tailor pro-enforcement activity to the type of violation that occurred, without regard to the industry involved.
But such justification for a pro-enforcement grant may not be needed, particularly if there is no objection from defendants. Consider the unique decision in Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation, 48 which appears to have gone unacceptably beyond Superior Beverage and its correct statement that the cy pres doctrine is nowadays "more flexible."
In the 2001 Motorsports case, involving the price fixing of NASCAR souvenirs, the court approved the distribution of excess settlement funds to ten different charities. In its cy pres order, the Court identified and described each charity chosen to receive funds, defined the use that the charity would make of the settlement funds and assessed its impact on the community. Any funds remaining after all of the distributions were made and all costs paid were to be given to two legal-aid organizations. 49 The Court stated that it "attempted to identify charitable organizations that may at least indirectly benefit the members of the class of NASCAR racing fans." Institute was invited by the judge, at the request of one of the parties, to submit a proposal. We proposed in detail a two-year project to benefit the class of automobile racing spectators as well as other consumers by studying how meaningful remedies can be provided to indirect purchasers who are injured by antitrust violations. We were not selected for an award. In re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litigation, 51 the Eighth Circuit found that the trial court had abused its discretion with respect to a cy pres distribution. 52 The first abuse occurred when the trial court "merely adopted liaison class counsel's proposed list of mostly local recipients, which had no relationship to the class action suit." 53 Basically, the Eighth Circuit found that there was no nexus between the injured class and organizations receiving unclaimed funds through a cy pres distribution.
54
A second abuse was the trial court's failure on remand to comply with the Eighth Circuit's opinion from the first appeal when it ordered the distribution of unclaimed funds. Said the Court,
The last time this case was before us, we drew upon Powell to emphasize the importance of tailoring a cy pres distribution to the nature of the underlying lawsuit.
In reversing the district court's initial distribution of funds to local charities, we 51 The cy pres distribution of the trial court was appealed twice and reversed twice. 
IV. CY PRES AS A COMPETITION-ENHANCING REMEDY
In situations where the nexus is not direct and immediate, it should be necessary to link the distribution to the underlying purposes of the statute that was violated. 60 In the case of antitrust, the allegations usually relate to anticompetitive conduct that has deprived the public of the benefit of freely functioning markets. Most often, the violation will involve horizontal collusion and the consumer class will be indirect purchasers who overpaid as a result of the collusion. Thus, a cy pres distribution would have a suitable nexus if it is directed at compensating the class and/or restoring competition within the particular market where the violation occurred and/or with the maintenance of competition more generally.
A. Restoration of competition within the same geographic market through grants to competitors.
We begin with a situation that has similarities to cy pres, but in which the creative remedy was built into the settlement itself. 62 It must be noted that this was not truly a cy pres settlement, in that the funds in question were not left over from a distribution, but were an integral part of the settlement. "In addition to the investigative expenses and attorneys fees specified in section IV, BFI will contribute the amount of $100,000 to a nonprofit entity designated by the Attorney General for use in funding analyses of ways to increase competition for the collection, transportation, or disposal of medical waste and to fund new entry or expansion by entities engaged in the collection, transportation, or disposal of medical waste generated by entities in Utah. This amount will be paid by BFI within thirty (30) It is Klein's understanding that the location in which the new entrant would operate was already zoned for industrial use, which prohibited hazardous waste but did not prohibit treatment of medical waste (infectious waste). Nevertheless, the city refused an operating permit for either the autoclave or, alternatively, a transfer station. The entrant already had ordered a new autoclave and ended up installing it at its site near Boise, Idaho, purchasing additional trucks to transport the medical waste from Utah to Boise.
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restore competition within the geographic and product market that was allegedly injured. 65 Although the money in a circumstance of this nature does not go directly to individual consumers, a clear nexus exists between the purposes of the statute, the class of injured consumers, and the intended use of the funds generated by the settlement.
Restoration of competition would benefit the consumers who had been injured.
As this Utah experience demonstrates, however, potential complexities may arise in an "industrial policy" intervention. When the effort to promote new entry failed, the State made grants directly to three small competitors already in the market, to strengthen their abilities to compete. 66 Both strategies --incentivizing entry and strengthening existing competitors through direct grants of cy pres funds-may require substantial continuing involvement by the court or its representative, and run a risk of providing a governmental competitive advantage to a subset of the market. On the other hand, in certain situations, these risks may be worth undertaking as the most promising way to restore competition to a market that was undermined by antitrust violations. 65 This represents an application to antitrust of a practice that is well-established in other types of litigation. For example, in the tobacco settlements, the States set aside a large portion of the money for anti-smoking advertising. Part of the settlement money in the cases against Firestone and Bridgestone for defective tires was used to fund an advertising campaign to the public so everyone would understand the importance of proper tire inflation. 66 According to Klein, note 63 supra, the remaining money was granted to three competitors:
A) Medical Disposal Services, an existing competitor, received $10,000 to secure its ability to continue delivering waste to Stericycle's incinerator for treatment. MDS used the $10,000 towards the purchase of a new truck to be used in servicing customers. B) Realty Ready, a new entrant to the market, received $5,000 to secure its ability to deliver waste to the Stericycle facility for incineration. The $5,000 was used for startup costs including containers, labels, bags, licenses, advertising, truck signage, and office set-up.
C) Larson-Miller, the largest new entrant, received $55,000, to offset certain expenses of entry (for which it had spent $480,000). It now services seven hospitals in Northern Utah and has the contract for the American Red Cross Blood Services in Utah.
B. Maintaining competition within the same product market
Another segment of the settlement funds was granted by Utah to the American Antitrust Institute for the purpose of constructing a "tool kit" that would assist law enforcement officials (not only in Utah, but in all states and in the federal agencies as well) to understand the legal and economic theories relating to competition in the medical waste disposal industry, thereby helping enforcers spot the types of situations in which antitrust intervention might be appropriate, providing them with the legal and economic arguments that they would be able to utilize in preparing a case, and gathering in one reference document information relating to other cases (e.g., complaints, discovery requests, declarations by economists) that could substantially reduce the law enforcement costs for the next antitrust intervention.
67 By reducing the transaction costs for antitrust intervention in the future and making the industry aware that the "tool kit" exists, this type of project can help maintain competition in an industry that had proven itself prone to anticompetitive behavior. Although the money does not go directly to individual consumers, there is a clear nexus between the purposes of the statute (to protect competition), the type of injury (reduction of competition in the medical waste disposal industry), and the intended use of the funds generated by the settlement.
C. Public education relating to the statute that was violated.
In In re Vitamin Cases a California court reviewed a proposed cy pres settlement of $38 million related to a vitamin price fixing scheme. 68 The vitamins involved in the scheme were used as supplements, included in food products, and even added to pet The settlement also established a system for cy pres distribution, which included employment of a funds administrator who operated like a foundation, accepting highly detailed applications that were reviewed by a staff and presented to a committee to make recommendations to the court. The administrator was also charged with monitoring grantees for compliance with the grant documents.
The American Antitrust Institute was a recipient of approximately $500,000 to conduct a two-year antitrust education project focused largely on California. The project consists of two related phases. In the first phase, a video film was produced for television, demonstrating the value of the antitrust laws for consumers and businesses. The film, "Fair Fight in the Marketplace," was re-edited for classroom use and made part of a package of classroom materials, teacher materials, and web-based additional resources, for introduction into California high school curricula. 70 Although money does not go directly to individual consumers, there is a clear nexus between the statute that was violated and the intended use of the funds generated by the settlement, i.e. that the law is more likely to be followed if more members of the public are familiar with its existence and rationale.
We are hardly unbiased, but we believe that the California court which approved the AAI's antitrust education project demonstrated a sound grasp of the propriety of using cy 70 The educational website is www.fairfightfilm.org. The video was produced under the supervision of the AAI by Filmmakers Collaborative. It has received two national awards for documentaries and has been aired on public television stations first in California and then around the country. The video, with its segments each introduced by a California prosecutor, was fully viewable on the website for several years and is now distributed via catalog to educators. The curriculum materials that are available on the website were produced under the supervision of the AAI by Street Law, an organization experienced in the development of law-related materials for schools. Street Law also conducted training of teachers in California, to encourage the introduction of the materials into the classroom.
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pres funds to support enforcement of the antitrust laws. This contrasts with an earlier episode in the Seventh Circuit.
In In re: Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 71 the Seventh Circuit at first held that "establishing an unneeded Foundation [a tax-exempt Foundation for research on complex
antitrust litigation] for these purposes from the reserve fund would be a miscarriage of justice and an abuse of discretion." "Instead [the court directs] that the remainder of the reserve fund escheat to the United States." The parties then agreed, instead, that the fund would be distributed between class members and law schools, and the district court approved this settlement. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit again voided the grants to the law schools for the reason that the earlier decision which prohibits the distribution of funds for antitrust purposes still "remains and shall not be circumvented by the parties or the district court" but stated that "it may be appropriate for the district court on remand to consider to some degree a broader nationwide use of its cy pres discretion." 74 Id.
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NPIFP because using the reserve fund to establish the NPIFP was appropriate under the cy pres doctrine.
75
The Seventh Circuit, in its second decision, was correct that there was too little nexus between a cartel case and distributing the funds generally to local law schools, assuming that law schools were not a significant part of the injured class of consumers. The rationale would seem to be on too high a level of generalization: i. plaintiff's lead counsel in a stipulated or unopposed order and the court generally accepted them. 78 On occasion, a court has requested proposed recipients to either make written submissions elaborating on how they would utilize the funds or to appear before the court to make a presentation. 79 Plaintiffs should carefully avoid any conflict of interest with the class in this selection of recipients and courts should play an active role in overseeing the grant process. Because "courts often lack the familiarity and resources to identify alternative uses of the funds and potentially qualified recipients," 80 plaintiffs' attorneys may be helpful by proposing a procedure for selecting the beneficiaries instead of specifying the particular cy pres distribution recipients in the settlement. 81 In any event, fair and clear selection procedures should be established in order to fulfill the best interests of absent class members and to minimize disputes over the settlement.
82
The initiative typically rests with plaintiffs' lead counsel, who will need to keep foremost in mind the objective of ensuring the best interest of the class members, as this will be the primary legal argument to be made in favor of a proposal. Relevant considerations will include the anticipated attitudes of the judge and, to a lesser extent, defense counsel. A remedy that is intended to help restore or promote competition might 78 Id. at 23. The American Antitrust Institute was recently the surprised recipient of a cy pres grant of nearly $1.7 million, which it has used principally to create an endowment fund. The AAI did not make an application for this grant and the grant contained no conditions. Wade v. Bayer AG et al, order the Shelby County Circuit Court, Tennessee, December 7, 2006 . 79 In House v. GlaxoSmithKlein, Docket No. 2:02cv442 (order filed March 30, 2006 in the Eastern District of the United States District Court for Virginia (Norfolk Division), Judge Morgan invited the nominees for awards to come to Norfolk and present their justifications for cy pres distributions. Plaintiffs' lawyers in the case had agreed on five nominees, including the AAI, but had also agreed not to promote particular candidates or award amounts. The AAI was ultimately awarded ten percent of the left-over funds, with the remainder being split equally among two hospitals, a medical schools, and a childrens rights organizations. The underlying case involved price fixing of a drug frequently prescribed to children and the Court opined that antitrust was further removed from the injured class than was health care for children. This is the only example we know of in which the plaintiff's nominees were called to the court to explain how they would spend funds. The AAI has been invited in other cases to provide the court with background on its makeup and activities and in some cases to provide a written proposal for how it would expend funds.
80 See Menocal, supra note 77.
81 See B. Seligman & J. Larkin, note 32 supra.
82 Id.
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be controversial, and of course cannot be adopted as part of a settlement if the defense refuses to go along, unless the Court (as in Diamond Chemical) approves.
In some situations, therefore, it may be the better tactic for plaintiffs to propose only that excess funds be distributed to public interest organizations that will promote effective competition in the industry where the antitrust problem occurred; in others, it may be enough to recommend named organizations, based on their general mission; in others, one might propose specifically named organizations along with specific projects that will carry out the intent of the litigation on behalf of the class and in still others, it might be most prudent to propose the appointment of a trustee to solicit specific proposals from a limited number of named organizations or even by public notice. In general, the more vague the proposal, the more latitude the judge will have to transfer excess funds to his or her own -or the lawyers'--pet charities. On the other hand, the more specific the proposal, the greater the likelihood it will trigger a negative response from defense counsel, particularly if the proposal is likely to enhance competition in the specific industry where the defendant was accused of abusive conduct. The plaintiff must be prepared to argue that the enhancement of competition should be viewed as an essential part of the remedy.
In a private class action case, where plaintiffs' attorneys are under scrutiny for sometimes appearing to obtain better results for themselves than for the class they represent, the inclusion of public-oriented antitrust remedies may enhance the reputation of the bar while making the huge effort normally entailed by a class action more socially worthwhile and professionally rewarding.
In a parens patriae antitrust case, it should be an inherent part of the state's strategy to create a remedy that provides restitution or damages for injured consumers and enhances competition, with cy pres an option for achieving that end, if direct relief isn't possible.
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With these thoughts as background, I offer the following as proposed best practices for courts, plaintiffs' lawyers and state enforcement officials 83 :
1. The first priority in an antitrust class action remedy is to assure that as many members of the injured class as possible are aware of their opportunity to file a claim and that the claims process is as simple and fair as possible, consistent with the need to deter fraud and achieve transactional efficiency.
2. Where funds are not distributed directly to the injured consumers, there must be a nexus between the nature of the claim and the uses to which the cy pres funds will be put.
The responsibility is on plaintiffs' class counsel (including parens patriae counsel, if applicable) to come forward with a plan for distribution. It is the responsibility of the court to assure that plans are equitable, administrable, and satisfy the requirements of the cy pres doctrine.
3. The benefit to the class may be direct or indirect and may be related to the industry in which the antitrust violation occurred, the type of harm that occurred, or to the restoration or enhancement of competition.
4. All things being equal, proposals for direct benefit to the class are to be preferred to proposals for indirect benefit and proposals that relate to the geographic scope of the harm are preferred to proposals that relate to only a segment of the geographic market in which the harm occurred.
5. Proposals should be rejected which entail possible anti-competitive effects, such as giving a marketplace advantage to a defendant. 83 These recommendations were discussed extensively in two joint meetings with class action plaintiffs' attorneys and state assistant attorneys general for antitrust and reflect an apparent consensus of those present. See http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/states2.ashx.
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6. If the class is so large compared to the size of the fund that the transaction costs render a distribution of cash infeasible, then a cy pres alternative should be designed as the essential part of the settlement or adjudicated order.
7. Where the fund is sufficiently large, the court should establish a foundation-like process not only for awarding and distributing the money, but also for overseeing the expenditures by cy pres recipients. In this case, a percentage of the fund should be set aside for administration and the order should set forth general objectives of the distribution, which could include different percentages targeted at different objectives.
The administrator should have some experience in analyzing, evaluating, and supervising grant proposals and their implementation.
8. Where the fund is not considered sufficiently large to encompass a foundation-like process, the plaintiffs should generally present multiple candidates for awards and describe how the candidates were selected (e.g., explaining any conflict or bias on the recommenders' part). The candidates should provide the court with their background, their proposal for how an award would be utilized, a justification for the award in terms of benefit to the class, and a commitment to provide one or more reports to the court in the future on how the money was in fact expended. This Section rejects the position urged by a few commentators that a cy pres remedy is preferable to further distributions to class members. Those commentators reason that further direct distributions would constitute a "windfall" to those class members. However, few settlements award 100 percent of a class member's losses, and thus it is unlikely in most cases that further distributions to class members would result in more than 100 percent recovery for those class members. In any event, this Section takes the view that in most circumstances distributions to class members better approximate the goals of the substantive laws than distributions to third parties that were not directly injured by the defendant's conduct.
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In principle, this seems correct, but several considerations suggest that the court should not automatically conclude that a second distribution will go to the same recipients. What factors might rebut the ALI's presumption? First, the second distribution would likely be smaller than the first, unless a miscalculation was made. Was the class much smaller than reasonably anticipated? Why did so many members of the class fail to file a claim or somehow fail to qualify? A small response could tend to imply that there are still many others in the class who were injured but who would receive no benefit from a second distribution to a segment of the class. A "fair and reasonable" distribution might well take their interests into account in the form of an appropriate cy pres distribution.
Second, if the amount available is smaller than what was previously distributed, the transaction costs of a second distribution may (or may not) make a second distribution to the same people less feasible. The court has the discretion to determine whether a net distribution after transaction costs is likely to provide more meaningful compensation for an antitrust injury to an individual class member than the first distribution standing alone.
A third consideration is that while settlements rarely obtain treble damages to which a plaintiff would be entitled in a total trial victory, we can only hypothesize as to 85 Id. at 227. what the outcome of the trial would have been. Moreover, because the matter was settled, there are presumably good reasons why the value of a total victory (or total defeat) have been discounted by the parties. What does it mean within a class settlement context to make a single member of the class "whole"? The negotiated damages reflect not only differing assessments of the strength of the evidence, but other risks of going forward such as class certification, Daubert issues and feared biases of juries or judges, the projected costs of further litigation, and other evaluations that lead to a dollar figure whose linkage to an individual class member's actual damages is necessarily quite attenuated. The argument that an injured class member will be made "more whole" by the second distribution, therefore, may not be strong. There is nothing unusual in antitrust for procedures or rules that are intended to streamline the process or assure deterrence, and in some cases cy pres will be more fair and reasonable than a second distribution.
Finally, in an antitrust context, the court should take into account the overall purposes of the case, which may well be to provide a remedy not only to those who were directly injured by the violation but to those who were indirectly injured or who would likely be injured in the future, but for the efforts of the litigants.
In short, subsection (b) establishes a reasonable principle, but should not be applied as if it were a rule. As the subsection itself says, there may be exceptions.
Subsection (c) of Section 3.07 appears to be largely consistent with the best practices we are proposing. The ALI's commentary definitively and correctly rejects the option of returning the remaining funds to the defendant, as this would reward the wrongdoer. 86 Escheat to the state is also rejected because it would benefit all citizens equally, even those who were not harmed by the defendant's alleged conduct. 87 The commentary continues:
86 Id. 87 Id.
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A cy pres award to a recipient that closely approximates the class is preferable to either of these options. Nonetheless, if no close approximation to the class can be identified, then a cy pres award is not justified. Moreover, even if such a nexus can be shown, a cy pres remedy should not be ordered if the court or any party has a significant prior affiliation with the intended recipient that would raise substantial questions about whether the selection of the recipient was made on the merits.
88
The ALI's concern about conflicts of interest is well-founded, with the caveat that a litigator's mere affiliation with a cy pres recipient (e.g., as an advisor) should not in and of itself disqualify a potential recipient, provided the nature of the relationship is disclosed and there is ample justification for the selection of the recipient on the merits.
The more difficult question is whether, as argued in this paper, the ALI would sanction cy pres distributions to third parties whose mission is to enhance the purposes of the law under which the litigation was conducted.
The ALI commentary includes an illustration of an employment-discrimination suit in which the individual African American class members seek damages and the parties propose a settlement that includes a payment to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
The ALI says that such a settlement would be improper, because the class claims should be made first. But if funds are left over at the end of the claims period, "the donation of the balance to an entity that indirectly benefits class members and other victims of race discrimination, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, would be appropriate if additional payments to identified class members would not be economically viable."
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This example is consistent with utilization of cy pres funds to enhance competition as part of a settlement of an antitrust case.
On the other hand, there is a danger in the language of ALI's section (c) to the extent that it would allow cy pres "only if the parties can identify a recipient involving the same subject matter as the lawsuit that reasonably approximates the interests being pursued by the class. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of cy pres has a proper role to play in the context of antitrust class actions, but there is a danger of abuse that has been recognized in the media and must be addressed by the bar and the judiciary. A variety of "best practices" presented in this paper and by the ALI can help avoid the pitfalls while assuring that cy pres is part of a remedy for competitive problems that brought the class into the courtroom.
